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This proposal is intended to examine human trustworthiness as a key component for 
countering insider threats in the arena of corporate personnel security. Employees with 
access and authority have the most potential to cause damage to that information, to 
organizational reputation, or to the operational stability of the organization. I am 
interested in studying the basic mechanisms of how to detect changes in the 
trustworthiness of an individual who holds a key position in an organization, by 
observing overt behavior – including communications behavior – over time. Rotter 
(1980) defines trust as a generalized expectancy - held by an individual or a group - 
which the communications of another (individual or group) can be relied upon. In this 
investigation, “trustworthiness” is defined as the degree of correspondence between 
communicated intentions and behavioral outcomes that are observed over time (Rotter, 
1980 & 1967). The degree of correspondence between the target’s words and actions 
remain reliable, ethical and consistent, which its degree of fluctuation does not exceed 
observer’s expectations over time (Hardin, 1996). To be able to tell if the employee is 
trustworthy is thus determined by the subjective perceptions from individuals in his/her 
social network that have direct business functional connections, and thus the opportunity 
to repeatedly observe the correspondence between communications and behavior. This 
study adopts the concept of correlating data-centric attributions, as observed changes in 
behavior from human perceptions; as analogous to “sensors” on the network. The 
Attribution Theory is adopted in the experimental situations (the “leader’s dilemma” 
game) to extract indirect perceptions of trustworthiness toward a critical worker over time 
in a group dynamics (Kelley, 1973). The principles of distinctiveness, consensus and 
consistancy are applied in these experimental situations. 
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Introduction 
Since Robert Hanssen, a US counterintelligence agent, started spying and gave away highly 
classified national security documentary materials to KGB1/SVR2 in Soviet Union / Russia in 
1970, the case of a betrayal of trust by a trusted, high-ranked insider was established (FBI 
National Press Office, 2001). This case portrays that not only the trust level of a key person 
with high-level security clearance could be altered, but the danger s/he brings to corporate 
security is maximized as s/he knows what and where the critical corporate resources are. In 
the Insider Threat Study by CERT (2004-2005), US DoD3, DHS4, & Secret Service 
investigated various insider threat cases and discovered that embedded in a mesh of 
communications, a person given high social power but with insufficient trustworthiness can 
create a single point of trust failure (Randazzo, et al., 2004; Keeney, et al., 2005). Thus, 
“insider threats” as an organizational problem gap is defined as executives or someone with 
authorized access, high social power and holding a critical job position, who is capable of 
inflicting high impact damage including psychological, managerial, or physical level, within 
an organization. 
 
Conceptualization 
Conceptualizing Trustworthiness 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework of my study into trustworthiness. It utilizes a 
multi-level analysis, including mixed “lenses” of organizational and individual norms. 
                                                 
1 KGB (transliterationof “КГБ”) is the Russian abbreviation for Committee for State Security (Комите́т 
Госуда́рственной Безопа́сности).
2 SVR is the Russian abbreviation for Foreign Intelligence Service (Служба Внешней Разведки), which is 
Russia’s primary external intelligence agency. 
3 US DOD stands for the US. Department of Defense. 
4 DHS stands for the Department of Homeland Security. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
Julian Rotter (1971) believes that “trust and trustworthiness are closely related.” Rotter (1980) 
defines trust as a generalized expectancy - held by an individual or a group - that the 
communications of another (individual or group) can be relied upon (Rotter, 1967, p. 652) 
regardless of situational specificity (Rotter, 1980). Hardin (1996), on the other hand, 
differentiates trustworthiness from trust. He believes that trustworthiness is “a moralized 
account of trust” (Hardin, 1996, p. 28). For example, a criminal (A) can trust a 
criminal-partner (B) to conduct a joint crime and there is no moral or ethical notion involved. 
However, it might take much more complexity in decisions for A to let B handle A’s 
financial accounts because A may not find B trustworthy (Hardin, 1996, p. 29). In this light, I 
define an employee’s “trustworthiness” as the generalized expectancy, a subjective 
probability, toward a target’s degree of correspondence between communicated intentions 
and behavioral outcomes that are observed and evaluated over time. In other words, the 
degree of correspondence between the target’s words and actions remain reliable, ethical and 
consistent, which its degree of fluctuation does not exceed observer’s expectations over time. 
To be able to tell if an employee is trustworthy is thus determined by the subjective 
perceptions of individuals in his/her social network who have direct business functional 
connections, and thus the opportunity to repeatedly observe correspondence of 
communication and behavior. 
 
Attribution Theory Review 
Attribution Theory intends to understand how people attribute (or assign) causes to another’s 
behavior (Heider, 1944 & 1958). It’s a cognitive perception. Attribution theory dichotomizes 
behavioral causes to both internal and external. If the causes of behavior are attributed to the 
person, it is called the internal attribution. Such causality of behavior is both internal and 
dispositional. If the causes of behavior are attributed to the situation, it is considered external 
attribution. The basic observational “setting” contains three major variables: the observer, the 
target and the situation. Perception can vary if the observations (or interpretation) are from 
different observers, or if the target being studied is different, or if the situation is different 
(Heider, 1958; Weiner, 2006, p. xvii). 
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Kelley (1973) suggests a causal attribution theory where an observer has multiple sources of 
relevant information, and is likely to infer and detect the causes of observed behavior. The 
observed behavior can be interpreted and perceived in a single observation – or through 
multiple observations over time. Kelley (1973) suggests three principles, distinctiveness, 
consensus and consistency, be applied in these multiple observations. 
 
Research Question 
I am interested in studying the basic mechanisms for detecting changes in the trustworthiness 
of an individual who holds a key position in an organization, by observing overt behavior – 
including communication behavior – over time (see, for example, Steinke, 1975). Since 
Steinke suggests that it is possible to detect cheating behavior without directly observing the 
individual, my overarching question with regards to insider threat phenomenon is: Why are 
the clues to a critical worker’s future behavior so difficult to detect by members of a 
community? Specifically, my research questions can be rephrased to three continuous 
sub-questions: With regards to personnel in authority positions, is it possible to detect 
changes in trustworthiness from subjective reflections and indirect perceptions of his/her 
social networks (peers, subordinates or associates)? If yes, what are the basic mechanisms of 
detecting changes in an individual’s trustworthiness level? Would it then be possible and 
reliable to predict the potential for insider threats in advance using these subjective 
reflections? 
 
Methodology 
I intend to design experiments to answer my research questions. The perception given by 
observers can vary depending on the interpretations of different observers, the target, and 
different situational settings (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 2006). The attribution of the target’s (A’s) 
behavior by observers (B’s) is believed and determined by B’s judgment that A intentionally 
or unintentionally (Heider, 1958) behaves in a way that the cause of behavior is attributable 
to either external (situational) causality or internal (dispositional) causality. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of Experimental Observation Over Time 
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The principle of distinctiveness shall be applied to the target’s behavior. In another words, the 
target’s behavioral change has to be noticeable for others to perceive it. In order to eliminate 
participant bias, consensus among observers should be obtained whenever possible. The 
consistency between the target’s words and actions shall be evaluated by these observers 
(Kelley, 1973) over time (Day 1 through Day N) until a given task is completed (Figure 2). 
 
Operationalization Rationale 
Consistency between the target’s (A’s) words and actions is an important indicator to 
properly measure generalized expectancy of this target’s social communication to and from 
his/her peers. The real focus of the study is to see how other people characterize the attributes 
of this leader during slightly suspicious behavior. Some challenging considerations and 
innovative ideas are utilized in the design of this experiment. 1.) Scenario encapsulation by a 
shielded title so that the unwanted participant acting bias can be filtered out. 2.) Manipulating 
the target through forcefully creating a dishonesty gap (Figure 4) between the interests of the 
leader and of the team players. 3.) A real-world case is simulated through feeding information 
to the participants in both public and private settings. 4.) The target is empowered through 
direct appointment. 5.) The art of “fishing dynamics” is introduced in the game scene while 
an authoritative figure is manipulating the target with an ethical dilemma. 6.) Team 
involvement is quickened through fun and competitive brain teasers. 7.) Experiment is 
designed to be flexible and can be repeated through “virtual asynchronous contest.” 
 
Experiment Design 
This experiment design is called the “leader’s dilemma” game. This experiment implements 
the concept of a “virtual asynchronous contest,” and is designed to recruit one real team, and 
share fictitious scores of three other teams (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Controlled Room Design of Pilot Study 
 
Figure 4: Logics for Virtually Controlled Contest 
 
The bright blue area is the actual team recruited - the gray areas represent fictitious teams. I 
plan to recruit 4 or 5 participants each experiment. One participant will be appointed as the 
leader (A). The remaining participants will be team players (Bn). The experimenter (M) will 
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be monitoring the game play and collecting observations. M’s role in this controlled 
environment will be that of a positive judge. The game-master (G) is in an authoritative 
position, but has a slightly negative role. G has knowledge of the competition and has the 
power to award the wining team. G’s job is to inject the bait (in the form of micro-currency) 
to entrap A. While A is entrapped, Bn perceives A’s behavior. The perceptions from Bn will 
be collected in various ways: 1) daily survey from Bn, 2) participant observation from M, and 
3) the individual semi-structured interview at the end of the experiment of both A and Bn by 
the experimenter, M. This virtual contest reaches its climax when a dishonesty gap is 
forcefully created by feeding the bait to the team leader alone (Figure 4). 
 
Study Contribution and Limitation 
In traditional information security strategy, in order to effectively quarantine polymorphic 
virus codes, it has been necessary to study how codes change. Likewise, we may be able to 
detect suspicious behavior and counter insider threats by studying how human behavior 
changes and how his/her trustworthiness is altered through indirect perception of others 
within an organization. This study provides basic mechanisms, clues, and early warning signs 
to investigate and detect fluctuating personnel trustworthiness; however it is important to note 
that these by no means possess full assurance to convict crimes. While these basic 
mechanisms could be adopted in cognitive modeling of detection systems, human 
intervention is still necessary in this loop. 
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